Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis

Edward Kane

No 7514, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper supplies an agency-cost and contestable-markets perspective on the financial policies that triggered the Asian financial crisis. The agency-cost analysis hypothesizes that individual-country regulators knew that politically directed loans had made their banks insolvent, but purposefully gambled that deregulation could allow the insolvent banks to grow their way out of trouble. The contestable-markets paradigm sets this gamble in the context of offshore innovations in financial technology and regulatory systems that made it progressively easier for worried Asian citizens to move funds to foreign institutions. These perspectives portray the simultaneous breakdown of repressive financial systems as a technology-led victory of market forces over longstanding government efforts to wall out foreign financial competition.

JEL-codes: F3 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published as Kane, Edward J., 2000. "Capital movements, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 153-175, May.

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Journal Article: Capital movements, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis (2000)
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