Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence

Stephen Coate and Timothy Besley

No 7579, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party elites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the salience of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.

Date: 2000-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Published as Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.

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Working Paper: Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence (2000)
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