The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties

Suzanne Scotchmer

No 9114, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I address the positive question of when countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as domestic inventors, and how their incentive to do so depends on reciprocity. I also investigate an equilibrium in which regional policy makers choose IP policies that serve regional interests, conditional on each other's policies. I compare these policies with a notion of what is optimal, and argue that harmonization will involve stronger IP protection than independent choices. Harmonization can either enhance or reduce global welfare. Levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The more extensive protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.

JEL-codes: F1 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tid
Note: ITI LE PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as Scotchmer, Suzanne. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, October 2004, 20(2): 415-37
Published as Proceedings, Conference on Technology, Productivity, and Public Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, November 7-8, 2003.
Published as Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "The political economy of intellectual property treaties," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties (2004)
Journal Article: The political economy of intellectual property treaties (2003)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties (2003)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties (2002)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties (2001)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties (2001)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties (2001)
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