Oligopoly Deregulation in General Equilibrium: A Tax Neutralization Result
Gilbert Metcalf and
George Norman ()
No 9416, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We examine the interplay between market structure and the form that commodity taxation should take in a general equilibrium model in which firms produce differentiated products and so are able to exert market power. Our analysis takes account of two important recent developments that affect market structure and so the appropriate design and effectiveness of commodity taxation: market deregulation and technological change. When market deregulation facilitates price discrimination, we find that tax policy is ineffective as a means to influence market structure. We further show that when tax rates are set optimally government is able to neutralize the potentially detrimental welfare impact of restrictive entry conditions in the differentiated product sector. Finally, we present conditions under which price discrimination is welfare improving.
JEL-codes: D43 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9416.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9416
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9416
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().