Renegotiation Proofness and Climate Agreements: Some Experimental Evidence

Leif Helland and Jon Hovi
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Jon Hovi: University of Oslo and CICERO, Oslo, Norway

Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 2008, vol. 34, 2

Abstract: The notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in non-cooperative models of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners' Dilemma generates predictions that contradict intuition as well as conventional wisdom about public goods provision. This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test two such predictions. The first is that the higher the cost of making a contribution, the more cooperation will materialize. The second is that the number of cooperators is independent of group size. Although the experiment was designed to replicate the assumptions of the model closely, our results lend very little support to the two predictions.

Date: 2008
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