{'italic': 'Legislative Leviathan', '#text': 'Paved with Partisan Intentions: The Impressive and Disheartening Validity of Cox and McCubbins’s'}

Benjamin Kinnard and John W. Patty

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2024, vol. 4, issue 4, 523-549

Abstract: party cartel modelWe expand the (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Cox and McCubbins, 2005) to incorporate the electoral environment. Our theory demonstrates how external electoral forces can affect the credibility of the majority party leadership’s use of appointments within the legislative process to maintain party loyalty. We then discuss these findings with a particular focus on the House GOP Conference since 2011, including the recent successful motion to vacate against then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy and the subsequent process ultimately electing Mike Johnson as Speaker of the 118th Congress in October, 2023.

Date: 2024
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