Entrenched Leviathans

Christian Fong

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2024, vol. 4, issue 4, 617-639

Abstract: Legislative LeviathanLegislative Leviathanargues that leaders internalize the welfare of the parties they lead and are therefore faithful agents of their parties. This assumption has had a large and productive influence on research on party leaders, but it also makes it hard to understand why the parties sometimes take rights and resources away from their leaders. Amending to assume that leaders vary in quality, want to stay in office, and can use their resources to entrench themselves resolves this puzzle. An empirical test that uses state legislatures uncovers patterns consistent with the theory’s novel predictions. The amended theory offers insight into underexplored aspects of how parties design their leadership offices and suggests new questions for research on party leaders.

Date: 2024
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