When Do Local Interest Groups Participate in the Housing Entitlement Process?

Michael Hankinson, Asya Magazinnik and Anna Weissman

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2024, vol. 5, issue 1, 47-69

Abstract: Local governments control a hidden flow of economic goods that never appear on city budgets. Through the housing entitlement process, city officials may condition approval on the benefits developers provide to organized interests. But the politics and policies created by this discretionary review have yet to be studied through the lens of interest group mobilization. We bridge this gap with an analysis of the behavior of construction unions in the housing entitlement process. Using data from 164 U.S. cities, we find that construction union representatives are more likely to attend public meetings to advocate for favorable labor agreements when the expected profitability of new housing developments is high — and thus, when there are more particularistic benefits on the table. While interest group competition within local participatory institutions may signal a robust, pluralist democracy, it also risks driving up housing costs, to the detriment of both organized and unorganized residents.

Date: 2024
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