Liability for Homelessness

David Foster and Joseph Warren

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2024, vol. 5, issue 1, 91-116

Abstract: Among other indictments, homelessness constitutes a failure of democracy. American voters predominantly support policies to address homelessness, yet government action remains inadequate. We trace this failure to political and technical complexities of homelessness that require policymaker effort to pursue effective programs. Using a formal model, we show how existing institutions undermotivate politicians to expend such effort, even with strong voter support. We compare an “electoral accountability” regime, in which a politician allocates tax revenue to ameliorate homelessness, with a “private liability” regime, in which wealthy citizens reduce their tax liability if all individuals are sufficiently housed (as judged by voters). In the latter, the wealthy internalize the costs and benefits of homelessness policy, creating an incentive to discover the most efficient policies. To determine whether the housing threshold is achieved, we present a sortition-based alternative of “housing juries” to increase democratic responsiveness while evading the deficiencies of electoral accountability.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000095 (application/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlpip:113.00000095

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucy Wiseman ().