Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers: Senatorial Constraints on Executive Branch Leadership Appointments in U.S. Federal Agencies

Gary E. Hollibaugh and George A. Krause

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2024, vol. 5, issue 3, 415-441

Abstract: This study proposes a theory of appointee reliability whereby the Senate employs its advise and consent powers to shape executive branch policymaking. As the electoral and policy interests of the Senate and president converge, the Senate will increasingly support executive branch policymaking efforts by increasing the reliability of executive appointees. As electoral and policy interests diverge, however, the Senate will seek to undermine executive branch policymaking efforts by reducing executive appointee reliability. Data on U.S. federal agency leadership appointments reveal empirical evidence consistent with this logic by showing that lower (higher) executive appointee reliability transpires during times of heightened (lower) ideological conflict between the president and Senate, particularly under divided government. Further, the empirical evidence uncovers additional ways the Senate can shape the executive branch appointment process.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlpip:113.00000107

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