Building a Record: Amending Activity, Position Taking, and the Seventeenth Amendment

Jamie L. Carson, Anthony J. Madonna, Mark E. Owens, Joel Sievert and Ryan D. Williamson

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2025, vol. 6, issue 1, 85-104

Abstract: Reelection is frequently viewed as the most important goal for members of Congress, and to be reelected, members take positions that are in line with that of their constituencies. We argue that position taking behavior of United States senators should have changed to accommodate a new electoral constituency after the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. Specifically, we look at amending activity by members of Congress before and after the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. By offering amendments on the floor, members can ensure certain issues get discussed and solidify their positions with their constituents. To examine our hypotheses, we examine a dataset of all amendments that received a roll call vote in either chamber from the 59th (1905–1907) to the 68th Congress (1923–1925). Our results provide support for our theoretical claims.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlpip:113.00000118

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