On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

Lone Grønbæk and Marko Lindroos

Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2010, vol. 1, issue 1, 49-70

Abstract: Game-theoretic models of fisheries typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. However, these types of models do not capture many real-world mixed fisheries, where species can be biologically independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting the preservation of biodiversity by setting up a two-species model with the aim of exploring the conditions under which both species can survive exploitation under non-cooperative management. The model starts out as a two-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to also include biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the maximum number of players that can preserve both species while satisfying the model's conditions. For visualization purposes, we simulate a two-species model with different kinds of interrelationships.

Keywords: Species preservation; Bioeconomic modeling; Two-species fisheries; Non-cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000004

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