When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness

David Ronayne and Daniel Sgroi

No 2018-W01, Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: We present results from an experiment involving 1,500 participants on whether, when and why good advice is ignored, focusing on envy and stubbornness. Participants performance in skill-based and luck-based tasks generated a probability of winning a bonus. About a quarter ignored advice that would have increased their chance of winning. Good advice was followed less often when the adviser was relatively highly remunerated or the task was skill-based. More envious advisees took good advice more often in the skill-based task, but higher adviser remuneration significantly reduced this effect. Susceptibility to the sunk cost fallacy reduced the uptake of good advice

Keywords: advice; skill; remuneration; envy; sunk cost fallacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C99 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2018-01-17
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https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/Papers/2018/wp-170118.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness (2018)
Working Paper: When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness (2018)
Working Paper: When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:1801

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