Measuring the Extent of Coalition Formation in Group Decision Making

Fred J. Ruppel and P. Lynn Kennedy

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1997, vol. 79, issue 4, 1288-1299

Abstract: Many group decisions begin with small coalitions that recruit additional members until they satisfy a voting rule. This paper introduces a technique for measuring coalition formation in group decision making. The setting involves N players bargaining over the share distribution of an asset. The N-person game is analyzed as a set of triads, numerically equal to {N!/(N — 3)!}/3!. A three-person game is presented to establish the context and to offer insights into the bargaining process. A four-person game is also presented. The technique finds immediate application in controlled laboratory experiments but has further relevance for numerous real-world contexts. Copyright 1997, Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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