Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

Olivier Mahul and Brian Wright ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2003, vol. 85, issue 3, 580-589

Abstract: When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: DESIGNING OPTIMAL CROP REVENUE INSURANCE (2000)
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