The Problem of Free Riding in Voluntary Generic Advertising: Parallelism and Possible Solutions from the Lab

Kent Messer (), Harry Kaiser and William D. Schulze

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2008, vol. 90, issue 2, 540-552

Abstract: Producers of many commodities pay for generic advertising, which is a public good for producers and, in cases like healthy foods, enhances social welfare. Though most programs were initially funded through the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, many became mandatory to mitigate free riding. This experimental research simulates key economic and psychological details of these programs and produces donation results strikingly similar to a historic example. Because mandatory programs may be declared unconstitutional, the Provision Point Mechanism is tested as an alternative. This research also shows that refund-by-request donation mechanisms establish a status quo of contributing and reduce free riding. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:90:y:2008:i:2:p:540-552

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