The interplay between satiation and temptation drives cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus foraging behavior and service quality toward client reef fish

Zegni Triki, Xiang-Yi Li Richter, Ana Pinto, Antoine Baud, Sandra A Binning, Mélisande Aellen, Yasmin Emery, Virginie Staubli, Nichola Raihani and Redouan Bshary

Behavioral Ecology, 2025, vol. 36, issue 6, araf131

Abstract: Supply and demand affect the values of goods exchanged in cooperative trades where high demand typically leads to a higher cost. An exception has been described in the marine cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and its variety of “client” coral reef fishes. Cleaner fish feed on clients' ectoparasites (ie gnathiid isopods) but prefer eating clients' mucus instead, which constitutes cheating. Here, we provide field observations, followed by a set of laboratory experiments with real client fish and Plexiglas feeding plates as surrogates for clients. In the field and in three experiments with real clients, we found that satiated cleaner fish were more cooperative, even though low hunger levels should make them less dependent on cleaning interactions. Similarly, the more abstract version of the cleaner–client experiments using Plexiglas plates offering two food types as stand-ins for client ectoparasites and mucus showed that satiation led cleaner fish to feed more against their preferences—an indicator of cooperative behaviour. However, this outcome occurred only if the temptation to eat the preferred food was low. When temptation to cheat was high, cleaner fish did so. We provide a further general support to these findings with a game-theoretic model. Many mutualisms involve food as a commodity. Thus, identifying foraging decision rules will enhance our understanding of how individuals adjust to variations in market conditions in real-time rather than playing a fixed strategy based on average market conditions.

Keywords: cheating; cooperation; decision-making; game theory; mutualism; wild fish (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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