Evolution and Organisational Choice in Nineteenth-Century Britain

Michael J Everett and Lanse Minkler ()

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 17, issue 1, 51-62

Abstract: This paper offers an explanation for the dearth of labor-managed firms in western economies. It argues that the historical evolution of labor-managed firms put them at a disadvantage relative to their classical, capitalist counterparts. In Britain, the government played an instrumental role in creating the initial disadvantage. Specifically, it took too long for the British government to remove the legal burden of unlimited liability and other company laws that were especially costly of labor-managed firms. Early financial instruments were also ill-suited to the establishment and continuation of producers' cooperatives of the day. Since organizational forms and their supporting institutions must coevolve, a path dependent process has continued to impede the development of labor-managed firms. (c) 1993 Academic Press, Inc. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1993
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