Three problems of social organisation: institutional law and economics meets Habermasian law and democracy
Kenneth L. Avio
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2002, vol. 26, issue 4, 501-520
Abstract:
This paper attempts to identify certain implications of Habermasian ethics for the economic analysis of law. It does so by demonstrating a complementarity between the Habermas of Between Facts and Norms and the Veblen--Ayres--Commons tradition(s) of economic analysis. Three unresolved problems of social organisation raised by the institutionalists are addressed: the legitimacy of the status quo ante (Buchanan-Schmid), the legitimacy of society's transaction structure (Klevorick) and the problem of social order (Hobbes-Platteau). Discourse ethics demonstrates how these problems may be resolved. The model of human agency adopted in institutional law and economics permits an easier fit with discourse ethics than would be possible with the neoclassical traditions. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:26:y:2002:i:4:p:501-520
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue
More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().