‘Better off as judged by themselves’: a critical analysis of the conceptual foundations of nudging

Alexander C Cartwright and Marc A Hight

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2020, vol. 44, issue 1, 33-54

Abstract: Libertarian paternalism claims to differ from traditional paternalism by making people better off, ‘as judged by themselves’. We argue that choice architects use ‘better off, as judged by themselves’ in a way that is systematically unclear and misleading. This unclarity, furthermore, makes recent debates about the efficacy and morality of employing nudges as public policy instruments in some cases are difficult, if not meaningless. Ultimately, the matter simply resolves into intuition pulling about values, making libertarian paternalism effectively equivalent to traditional paternalism.

Keywords: Behavioural economics; Behavioural law and economics; Paternalism; Default rules; Nudge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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