Optimal 'Mismatch' and Promotions

Joni Hersch

Economic Inquiry, 1995, vol. 33, issue 4, 611-24

Abstract: Seeming 'mismatches,' in which workers are either under- or overqualified, are shown to be optimal. From the firm's point of view, although turnover will be positively related to overqualification, training costs will be inversely related to overqualification. Further, overqualified workers constitute a pool from which promotions are made. Workers enter seeming mismatches due to search and mobility costs and because of opportunities for promotion. Estimates using a unique data set indicate that workers who are overqualified at hire receive less training and more promotions and that workers overqualified for their current job are more likely to quit. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:33:y:1995:i:4:p:611-24

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().