Beliefs About Other-Regarding Preferences in a Sequential Public Goods Game

Jennifer C. Coats and William Neilson

Economic Inquiry, 2005, vol. 43, issue 3, 614-622

Abstract: Experimental evidence is used to deduce players' beliefs about their opponents' concern for others. The experiment is a sequential public good provision game with a provision point and two different refund rules. A theory is constructed to show how early contributions should change with the refund rule depending on the first mover's beliefs about subsequent players' other-regarding preferences. The evidence rejects the hypothesis that early players believe that their opponents are inequality averse and also rejects the hypothesis that early players are concerned with security. The evidence is consistent with beliefs in spite, reciprocity, or a concern for security. (JEL H41, C90, D63, D64) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: C90 D63 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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