 Store loyalty, bargaining power and the private label production issueFabian Bergès-Sennou European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2006, vol. 33, issue 3, 315-335 Abstract: One of many explanations offered for the rise of private labels (PLs) is that they increase the bargaining power of the retailer. The prior question of the PL production assignment has not been analysed in an economic framework. The retailer can either entrust the production of his PL to the national brand (NB) manufacturer at a low unit cost, with the disadvantage that both products (NB and PL) are held by the same agent, or he can choose a firm from the competitive fringe with a higher unit production cost. In a framework where loyalty (presence of store-switching and brand-switching consumers) and bargaining strength count, we show that the retailer will assign his PL production to the NB manufacturer when the latter's bargaining power is low. However, a higher consumer loyalty for the NB can reverse the retailer's decision. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press. Date: 2006 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:erevae:v:33:y:2006:i:3:p:315-335 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo More articles in European Review of Agricultural Economics from Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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