 Interconnections: A Contractual Analysis of the Regulation of Bottleneck Telephone MonopoliesChristopher Weare Industrial and Corporate Change, 1996, vol. 5, issue 4, 963-92 Abstract: This paper employs an institutional framework to analyze the regulation of dominant telecommunications firms in vertically related markets. It focuses on two alternative regulatory regimes employed in the telecommunications industry: (1) a divestiture regime in which the dominant firm is precluded from entering competitive, vertically related markets; and (2) an integrated/open access regime in which the dominant firm is allowed to enter these markets subject to providing competitors with equal access to its network. An analytical framework based on transaction cost economic theory is developed and applied to three case studies of regulation and competition its telecommunications industry. The main findings are that higher levels of transactional complexity and uncertainty lead to increased transaction and regulatory costs under both regimes, and that when one controls for transactional characteristics, the efficiency attributes of the two regulatory regimes do not differ greatly. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press. Date: 1996 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:indcch:v:5:y:1996:i:4:p:963-92 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Industrial and Corporate Change is currently edited by Josef Chytry More articles in Industrial and Corporate Change from Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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