Intraparty Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of the Modern Congress: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1890-1920

David Brady and David Epstein

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1997, vol. 13, issue 1, 26-49

Abstract: In this article, the emergence of the modern Congress characterized by a seniority system, strong committees, and weak party leadership, is linked to changes in external electoral forces. Specifically, we argue that the changes in both House and Senate organization were driven by the rise of heterogeneity within the dominant Republican party. We show that the centralized systems of Cannonism and Aldrichism were incompatible with the heterogeneous preferences created by the rising numbers of Progressive Republicans, causing both Houses to reform their systems of allocation of desirable committee posts. Furthermore, the different modes of change between the Houses are due to basic differences in structure. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:26-49

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