Vertical Integration, Exclusivity, and Game Sales Performance in the US Video Game Industry

Ricard Gil and Frédéric Warzynski

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2015, vol. 31, issue suppl_1, i143-i168

Abstract: This article empirically investigates the relation between vertical integration and game performance in the US video game industry. For this purpose, we use a data set on video game monthly sales from 2000 to 2007. We complement these data with information on game developers and the timing of all mergers and acquisitions during that period allowing us to separate vertically integrated games from independent games exclusive to a platform. First, we show that integrated games are associated with higher sales and higher prices than independent games. Second, we find suggestive evidence that most of the difference in performance is due to better release strategies and selection in game quality. We show that post-release marketing strategies do not seem to add value to vertically integrated games. Finally, we also find that exclusivity is associated with lower demand and higher prices due to lower inherent quality and better release strategies, respectively. (JEL L22, L24, L25, L86).

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewu006 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Vertical Integration, Exclusivity and Game Sales Performance in the US Video Game Industry (2010)
Working Paper: Vertical Integration, Exclusivity and Game Sales Performance in the U.S. Video Game Industry (2009)
Working Paper: Vertical Integration, Exclusivity and Game Sales Performance in the U.S. Video Game Industry (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:31:y:2015:i:suppl_1:p:i143-i168.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat

More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().