Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results

Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, vol. 107, issue 2, 511-539

Abstract: This paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents. More precisely, we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups. Equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator (usually the firm). The effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group's cost disadvantage. When the cost disadvantage is severe, these programs significantly increase effort levels (and hence profits). The opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight.

Date: 1992
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Related works:
Working Paper: ASYMMETRIC TOURNAMENTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAWS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOME EXPERIMENTAL RESULT (1990)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results (1987)
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