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Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules

Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, vol. 117, issue 2, 503-535

Abstract: It is well-known that if international linkages are relatively small, the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited. But when goods and financial markets are tightly linked, is it problematic if countries unilaterally design their monetary policy rules? Are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination? We argue that under plausible assumptions the answer is no. Unless risk aversion is very high, lack of coordination in rule setting is a second-order problem compared with the overall gains from macroeconomic stabilization.

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Orientated National Monetary Rules (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2001) Downloads
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

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