A Theory of Board Control and Size

Milton Harris () and Artur Raviv

The Review of Financial Studies, 2008, vol. 21, issue 4, 1797-1832

Abstract: This article presents a model of optimal control of corporate boards of directors. We determine when one would expect inside versus outside directors to control the board, when the controlling party will delegate decision-making to the other party, the extent of communication between the parties, and the number of outside directors. We show that shareholders can sometimes be better off with an insider-controlled board. We derive endogenous relationships among profits, board control, and the number of outside directors that call into question the usual interpretation of some documented empirical regularities. (JEL G34) The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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