Life Insurance: Regulation as Contract Enforcement

Alan Morrison

No 2004-FE-09, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Debating the minutiae of insurance regulation without a clear understanding of why insurance companies are regulated is futile. In this non-technical essay I discuss the economic rationale for insurance business regulation. I conclude that the appropriate role of the regulator in this industry is to enforce contracts which would otherwise be broken. This implies that regulation should be optional, and that regulation need not be a monopoly activity.

Keywords: Insurance regulation; contract enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2a444944-4d5a-4062-8739-f4b80b5c17e7 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:2004-fe-09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).