Cooperation in Multiple Spheres of Interaction

Heinrich Harald Nax

No 394, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This note introduces transferable utility cooperative games with multiple membership, extending the scope of cooperative game theory to economic environments featuring externalities and membership in multiple coalitions. This wider class of games generalises games in characteristic and partition function form. definitions of the core for this class of games are proposed, under which cooperation is facilitated through the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements with multiple membership.

Keywords: Cooperative Game Theory; Core; Externalities; Multiple Membership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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