Revealed and Concealed Preferences in the Chilean Pension System: An Experimental Investigation

Abigail Barr and Truman Packard

No 53, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using survey data and a field experiment to measure agents` risk and time preferences, we identify the agent-type that is free to reveal its preferences through decisions about pension system participation. Thus, we show that in Chile the appropriate focus for policy makers interested in the welfare-enhancing effects of such participation are the self employed. They are indistinguishable from other economically active agents with respect to time and risk preferences and sort into participants and non-participants in the pension system with reference to those preferences. In contrast, employees are rationed. The more patient and less risk averse self employed participate.

Keywords: field experiment; time preference; risk aversion; pension reform; self employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 G23 J23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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