Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification

Gerardo A. Guerra

No 87, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Ultimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject`s behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presets a taxonomy of certification, and provides experimental evidence supporting the commonly observed use of rankings in certificates, as well as the restriction of awareness by certifiers to increase revenue. Regulatory implications are discussed.

Keywords: ultimatum; bargaining; experiments; certification; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C90 D18 D63 D82 L15 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02-01
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