Efficiency in IPO Issuance Processes&quest

Nayantara Hensel

Business Economics, 2005, vol. 40, issue 4, 55-66

Abstract: Is the online auction an efficient mechanism for pricing initial public offerings (IPOs)? Its intent was to minimize first day price surges in IPOs, which represented “money left on the table” for issuers. Evidence from Google's IPO suggests that the online auction process may not have minimized the first day price surge, since 82 percent of the IPOs issued in 2004 using the traditional process experienced less of an increase. Furthermore, a comparison of auction IPOs with traditional IPOs issued in the same year and in the same threedigit SIC code suggests that 44 percent of the auction IPOs have greater first day price surges than their traditional counterparts. A broader comparison of the pricing behavior of auction IPOs with traditional IPOs presents a mixed picture and suggests that the size of underwriter may be an important factor. The mispricing that occurs in auctions may be due to an informational asymmetry on the part of small investors. This informational gap could arise because small investors lack access to the information sources that institutional investors have or because companies are not required to provide detailed information in the online process, inasmuch as they don't undergo the rigorous scrutiny of investment banks in the traditional bookbuilding process. This informational gap may be alleviated by the SEC reforms of the “quiet period” and by the issuer providing more detailed information on the uses of the funds.Business Economics (2005) 40, 55–66; doi:10.2145/20050405

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/be/journal/v40/n4/pdf/be200529a.pdf Link to full text PDF (application/pdf)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/be/journal/v40/n4/full/be200529a.html Link to full text HTML (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:buseco:v:40:y:2005:i:4:p:55-66

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11369

Access Statistics for this article

Business Economics is currently edited by Charles Steindel

More articles in Business Economics from Palgrave Macmillan, National Association for Business Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().