Experimental Economics, Game Theory and Das Adam Smith Problem

Amos Witztum ()
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Amos Witztum: London School of Economics

Eastern Economic Journal, 2016, vol. 42, issue 4, No 4, 528-556

Abstract: Abstract Experimental economics challenges the mainstream by arguing that only social rational agents will produce a socially desirable outcome in competitive interactions. However, the solution of Das Adam Smith Problem provided neo-classical economics with its own cover: self-interested people can be socially minded and only among ethical self-interested agents will competitive interaction succeed. I will challenge both assertions in this paper. I will argue that what experimental economists would call as social may not be such and that socially minded individuals are not likely to be the self-interested agent depicted by neo-classical economics.

Keywords: Adam Smith; experimental economics; human sociality; B12; B41; C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1057/s41302-016-0006-9

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