Moral Hazard, Contracts and Social Preferences: A Survey

Florian Englmaier

Chapter 6 in Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour, 2005, pp 125-139 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter provides a non-technical survey of recent contributions to the emerging field of behavioural contract theory that try to incorporate social preferences into the analysis of optimal contracts in situations of moral hazard. The presence of these social preferences is confirmed by numerous studies. Taking them into account when analysing optimal contracts generates important new insights, and might help us gain a better understanding of real-world contracts and organizational structures.

Keywords: Social Preference; Optimal Contract; Participation Constraint; Team Production; Moral Hazard Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-0-230-52234-3_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230522343_6

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