Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation

Bhaskar Dutta

Chapter 8 in Social Choice Re-Examined, 1996, pp 3-23 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The theory of implementation is concerned with the design of schemes or mechanisms which will induce individual agents to reveal correctly privately-held information for public use. Since much of neoclassical economics gives primacy to individual self-interested behaviour, it is natural to assume that individuals will voluntarily reveal their private information only if it is in their interests to do so. However, the objective or goal of the ‘planner’ need not coincide with those of the individual agents, although it will typically depend on the agents’ private information. The need to induce agents to reveal the necessary information may, therefore, act as a constraint both on the choice of procedures which can be used as decentralized decision procedures and on the type of objective functions which can be ‘achieved’ or ‘implemented’.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Reasonable Mechanism; Local Independence; Generalize Monotonicity; Implementation Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25214-5_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_1

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