Reciprocity

Robert Sugden

Chapter 6 in The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, 2005, pp 108-125 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Suppose you are an American academic. I am an English one. We are on exchange visits to each other’s universities, and have exchanged houses. Having met a crowd of boisterous Americans, I should like to throw a party in your house on the night before I return to England. I know what this will lead to — cigarette burns on the chairs, beer stains on the carpets — but this doesn’t greatly concern me: I won’t have to live with the mess afterwards. Meanwhile you have met a crowd of unrestrained Brits, and you would like to throw a party for them on the night before you leave …

Keywords: Equilibrium Strategy; Good Reply; Good Move; Good Standing; Extended Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-53679-1_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230536791_6

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