Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policy

Mark Baimbridge, Jeffrey Harrop and George Philippidis
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Jeffrey Harrop: University of Bradford
George Philippidis: University of Bradford

Chapter 5 in Current Economic Issues in EU Integration, 2004, pp 79-98 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The European Central Bank (ECB) is a creation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which designed it to be the most independent monetary authority in the world. The ECB’s architects sought to insulate it completely from political pressures, both at the national government and at the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)-zone level. The position of the ECB under the TEU permits no clear accountability to national nor federal European institutions. It stipulates that the ECB Council’s deliberations remain confidential, whilst the only method of questioning the ECB’s policies is through periodic reports to the European Parliament.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Euro Area; European Central Bank; Price Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-59816-4_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230598164_5

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