 How Chinese Styled Executive Remuneration Works: Evidence from Chinese Red-ChipsJessica Hong Yang and Nada K. Kakabadse Chapter 3 in How to Make Boards Work, 2013, pp 75-94 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Executive remuneration has attracted much attention from both academics and practitioners in the past two decades (Murphy, 1985; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). A well-designed executive remuneration is significant to a firm’s performance, especially during financial crisis (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). An astonishing survey shows that the average executive pay of Standard & Poor 500 firms increased more than four times from $3.5 million to $14.7 million and the granted stock options to CEOs increased nearly nine-fold from 1992 to 2000 (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). The design of executive remuneration therefore attracts a great attention in the world. Issues of concern, especially in the banking field, include poor remuneration packages, enormous executive salaries and excessive short-term risk-taking. An unprecedented number of financial firms suffered extensive collapse during the 2008 global financial crisis. Keywords: Corporate Governance; Firm Performance; Human Resource Management; Executive Compensation; China Security Regulatory Commission (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-27570-7_4 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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