Chinese Executive Compensation: Where Do We Stand?

Martin Conyon and Lerong He
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Lerong He: State University of New York

Chapter 7 in Developing China’s Capital Market, 2013, pp 146-175 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In recent years, scholars have begun to devote significant attention to the systematic examination of Chinese corporate governance given China’s tremendous economic growth and development of capital markets (Allen et al., 2005; Conyon and He, 2011; Hu et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2003, 2010). Executive pay is a significant corporate governance issue. The optimal design of compensation contracts helps resolve agency costs associated with the separation of firm ownership from its control. There are several important questions to address. Are Chinese executives paid in the same way as western executives, given China’s limited experience with stock markets and governance reform? Are the drivers of executive pay, such as firm performance and size, as important in China as in the west? How does the Chinese state affect the provision of incentives in Chinese firms? These questions are, of course, located in the broader question of whether executive pay will globalize along American lines (Cheffins, 2003).

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Firm Performance; Stock Option; Supervisory Board; Executive Compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-34157-0_7

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137341570_7

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