Conclusion

Philippe Espinasse
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Philippe Espinasse: University of Hong Kong

Chapter 9 in IPO Banks, 2014, pp 110-113 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Appointing lead banks for an IPO can be a complex and time-consuming exercise. But it is well worth extending the effort to ensure that the senior syndicate banks are well-qualified, and also able to work harmoniously together. Importantly, a tight, core group of houses should be responsible for driving the transaction, with perhaps a slightly wider number of firms involved in the marketing phase per se, from assembling a group of cornerstone investors (if any), right through to the pricing and allocation stages. Appointing a very large number of firms for any IPO is simply the wrong thing to do: it will irremediably dilute responsibilities and economics while in no way ensuring that a wider pool of investors is accessed and allocated. More banks do not equal more demand, and even less so higher quality allocations of stock to investors.

Keywords: Hedge Fund; Offer Price; Wrong Thing; Wide Pool; Reputable Firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-41294-2_30

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137412942_30

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