Slippery Alliances in Central America: Multinationals, Dictators, and (Under) Development Policies

Marcelo Bucheli ()
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Marcelo Bucheli: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Chapter Chapter 14 in Big Business and Dictatorships in Latin America, 2021, pp 373-397 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The Central American authoritarian regimes have long been considered the quintessential examples of “puppets” of American interests in the region. This chapter studies the evolving relationship between dictators and foreign capital in Central America. I argue that the alliance between those regimes and foreign capital was not determined by ideological affinities but rather by foreign capital’s capability of bringing stability and personal enrichment to the rulers. Once the multinationals could no longer offer these benefits, the dictators broke the alliance and even realigned themselves with those who opposed the multinationals. The 1974 oil crisis marked the breaking point.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pslchp:978-3-030-43925-5_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-43925-5_14

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