Directed Search and Job Rotation
Fei Li () and
Can Tian ()
Additional contact information
Can Tian: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract:
We consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined and match quality is initially unknown. A large firm benefits from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome loss of mismatch. As a result, in the unique symmetric equilibrium, large firms have higher labor productivity and lower separation rates. In contrast to the standard directed search model with multi-vacancy firms, this model can generate a positive correlation between firm size and wage without introducing any ex ante productivity differences or imposing any non-concave production function assumption.
Keywords: Directed Search; Job Rotation; Firm Size and Wage; Firm Size and Labor Productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J64 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2012-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Journal Article: Directed search and job rotation (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:12-024
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