A Model of Income Tax Evasion with Venal Tax Officials: The Case of Taiwan

C Y Cyrus Chu

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1990, vol. 45, issue 3, 392-408

Abstract: Based on interviews with 1/10 of all the CPAs in Taiwan, a prototype of income tax evasion within a corrupt bureaucratic system is summarized. It is shown that the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion needs to be modified to capture the characteristic of this prototype. Conventional tactics (increasing penalty, raising the probability of detection) may only encourage taxpayers to intensify their bribing activities to avoid possible punishment, which can further corrupt the tax system. Instead, in developing countries where tax evasion goes hand in hand with corruption, a crack-down on corruption seems to be a more sensible approach.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:45:y:1990:i:3:p:392-408

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance = Finances publiques
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().