Suspicion and Communication

Lisa Bruttel, Friedericke Fromme () and Vasilisa Werner ()
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Friedericke Fromme: Universität Potsdam
Vasilisa Werner: Universität Potsdam, Berlin School of Economics

No 86, CEPA Discussion Papers from Center for Economic Policy Analysis

Abstract: In this paper, we study how communication influences suspicion. The experiment uses a sender-receiver setup with a low probability of misaligned incentives for senders and receivers. We focus on the impact of open communication on the receivers’ suspicion as measured by the size of the deviation from the senders’ recommendation before and after the communication. Overall, communication substantially reduces suspicion, but some receivers become more suspicious during the communication. We disentangle these effects using machine learning methods to analyze the chat logs.

Keywords: cooperation; communication; suspicion; lying; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pot:cepadp:86

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