Alternative vs Traditional Corporate Governance Systems in Italy: An Empirical Analysis

Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini (), Laura Pellegrini and Emiliano Sironi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The 2003 Italian Corporate Law Reform, establishing one-tier vs. two-tier board for listed and unlisted joint stock companies, introduced alternative corporate governance systems. This study implements probit regressions in order to compare 548 unlisted firms: corporations with best performances in sales and capital structure, as well as those under “control and coordination”, maintain a traditional system. Conversely, firms with a high proportion of individual shareholders adopt alternative systems. For alternative system firms, split between one-tier and two-tier boards, companies under “control and coordination” action tend to implement a one-tier system, same as firms with a higher proportion of individual shareholders.

Keywords: corporate governance; one-tier board; two-tier board (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010, Revised 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Problems and Perspectives in Management 3.8(2010): pp. 4-15

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:104656

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