Costo degli organi societari e scelta dei sistemi di governance alternativi: l’evidenza empirica in Italia

Cost of corporate bodies and choice of alternative governance systems: empirical evidence in Italy

Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini (), Laura Pellegrini and Emiliano Sironi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The literature on corporate governance has investigated the relationship between the adoption of a corporate governance system and firms’ performance, but it seems to ignore the issue of costs of the body corporate members among different systems, i.e. the traditional and alternative models, with specific reference to unlisted companies. The paper aims to investigate to what extent the costs of each corporate body may affect the choice of a corporate governance system. The analysis, that is led on a sample of unlisted Italian corporations in 2008, shows that the one-tier system, characterizing firms not necessarily small, with more fragmented ownership structures and more likely to be under control and coordination, highlights lower costs than the traditional and the two-tier systems.

Keywords: sistema di controlli; costo dei controlli; sistemi di governance alternativi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013, Revised 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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