Cartel Stability with Quality-Anchored Buyers

Iwan Bos, Berardino Cesi and Marco Marini

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This note examines cartel stability in a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality-anchored buyers. It is shown that such buyers are a facilitating factor for collusion.

Keywords: Captive Consumers; Cartel Stability; Collusion; Quality-Anchored Buyers; Ver- tical Product Differentiation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 C72 D4 D43 L1 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:125064

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