Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists

Vilen Lipatov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Economists agree that accounting specialists are helpful in avoiding taxes. We argue that such help can often be called sophisticated evasion. We analyze it in a game of incomplete information played by tax authority, corporate taxpayers and accounting specialist. When sophisticated evasion is very common, marginal changes in enforcement are not effective, so radical measures are needed for improving compliance. Fines on firms as opposed to specialist are more effective in facilitating such measures. When the evasion is modest, auditing and accounting costs as opposed to fines are more effective in curbing it.

Keywords: tax evasion; tax avoidance; sophisticated evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05, Revised 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14181/2/MPRA_paper_14181.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24472/1/MPRA_paper_24472.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33998/3/MPRA_paper_33998.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Corporate tax evasion: The case for specialists (2012)
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